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中国说“不”导致哥本哈根大会失败?

有些评论人士认为中国在哥本哈根气候谈判中搅了局。曹海丽则称,现实远比这个说法复杂。

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如果气候变化仅仅是一个环境问题,那么,解决起来可能要容易得多。但是,它显然是一个涉及政治、经济、发展等多重国家利益关系的问题,其间的利益分化和纠葛错综复杂,这使得达成一个令各方满意的国际协议注定困难重重。

为期两周的哥本哈根会议在很多人来看,是一次惨重的失败和灾难:在少数几个关键国家闭门磋商后产生的《哥本哈根协议》,是一份水得不能再水、和预期目标相去甚远、没有任何法律效力的政治文件。而且至少有五个国家至今仍纠缠在程序透明和合法性问题上。他们的谈判代表在最后一晚上的愤激言辞为这次举世瞩目的大会划上了一个戏剧性的句号。

大会最后48小时到底发生了什么,至今仍是众说纷纭。中国官方通讯社新华社报道称,中国总理温家宝没有被邀请参加当地时间12月17日晚和18日晨“由美国发起”的秘密会谈,为此颇有意见。印度气候谈判特使萨兰也在18日下午的新闻发布会上提及这一细节。

而英国气候自由撰稿人、马尔代夫政府特别顾问马克·莱纳斯则在英国《卫报》上撰文,他出席了周五(12月18日)晚上由20多个国家领导人参加的闭门会谈,亲眼见证“中国是如何搅局的”。中国总理温家宝依然没有出席那次闭门会谈,而由外交部副部长代为出席。在西方媒体的类似报道中也都认为,因为不满美国执意要求中国的国内减排工作接受国际核查,温家宝拒绝参加有奥巴马参加的这两次闭门会议,导致谈判受阻。

英国环境部长米利·班德在《卫报》上撰文,中国“劫持”了哥本哈根协议;英国首相戈登·布朗则乐观表示,中、美未来将会“有更多作为”。

除了和美国在MRV问题上的严重分歧,中国被指“搅局”的主要行为是,坚决反对在文本中出现“2050年全球在1990年基础上减排50%,其中发达国家减排80%”的目标。

中国反对的理由很简单,这个目标会限制中国的发展——以中国目前的发展速度和经济、能源结构,中国很难在2050年实现这一目标。根据中国谈判代表之一、国 家气候中心副主任吕学都的解释,1990年全球碳排放约210亿吨,到2050年减半就是105亿吨,而中国2005年的排放量已达60亿吨,按照现在的速度发展下去,105亿吨排放量或许到时还不够中国自己用,更不用说全球了。

换句话说,中国不想要对其发展有国际法律约束力的限制,不愿意把任何有可能给中国限定温室气体排放上限(cap)的条款写入文本里,因为它担心国内的政治经济稳定。

中国的这一立场并非突如其来,而是始终坚持的一点。特别是自2009年10月的曼谷会议以来,由于欧盟立场的转变,谈判的核心已经变成是坚持《巴厘路线图》 制定的双轨制还是两轨并一轨。在前者的框架下,包括中国在内的发展中国家并不需要承诺强制减排目标。但如果并成一轨,中国受到的约束力将大大加强。在这种情况下,中国和主要发达国家之间的冲突明显加剧,成为气候谈判这个困局中的一块(a piece of the puzzle),并且是很大的一块。

但是,认为如果没有中国的反对,就能达成一个有法律效力的强有力的协议的看法,也绝非现实。只要看看八前年启动但至今仍搁置的多哈回合谈判就知道,在这个谈判中,中国并不是主要的利益方。在多哈回合之前,美国和欧洲还能控制局面。但随着发展中国家的发言权越来越大,以及联合国自下而上的决策体系,过去的时代一去不复返。多边谈判已经不再是某一个国家,甚至某一个利益集团所能控制的,更何况气候谈判涉及的利益和层面较贸易谈判远为复杂。

即使没有中国的强硬说“不”,国际气候谈判的另一决定性力量,美国所能承诺的减排目标也会使哥本哈根气候谈判难以达成。

根据美国国会众议院通过的能源法案,美国到2020年在2005年基础上应实现减排17%,如果换算成按1990年基础计算,仅相当于减排4%,不仅离发展中国家提出的40%的目标相去甚远,就是和欧盟提出的20%-30%的目标也难以匹配。但美国仍然声称自己已作出足够的努力。

美国的政治体制决定了美国总统并不具有绝对决定权。而美国国会在过去二十多年时间里,越来越沿着党派界线分化。这使得任何一个提案的通过都费尽周折。目前, 众议院通过的《清洁能源安全法案》尚在参议院讨论。民主党参议员约翰·克里虽然积极支持达成一个气候协议,并专程赶到哥本哈根游说。但所有人都知道,要让严重分化的参议院通过他的提案而不让其缩水,绝不是一件容易的事。这决定了美国不可能在哥本哈根会议上提出更高的减排数字。

事实上,缩水的《哥本哈根协议》也是美国乐见其成的。因为美国国会还没有做好接受任何有国际法律约束力协议的准备。奥巴马政府也需要更多智慧和策略保证《清洁能源安全法案》在2010年的春天在参议院通过。否则,美国政府在谈判中的任何承诺都是一张“空头支票”。

同时,印度等较为发达的发展中国家也不愿意接受任何来自发达国家的限额压力。印度环境部长拉梅什8月底曾造访北京,目的便是和中国商讨结成同盟共同抵制西方 国家的压力。印度的温室气体排放总量和人均排放量都远落后于中国,但对印度来说,如何处理好发展和环境之间的矛盾,同样是一个大问题。从这个意义上说,对限定减排总量说“不”,中国并非孤立。

哥本哈根会议达成一个缺乏法律效力的极弱的政治文件,中国算是为自己的发展买了时间。但这一权宜之计能维持多久并不好说。中国继续说“不”的国际压力已经越来越大,不仅来自发达国家,也来自受气候变化影响最大的不发达发展中国家。而且,中国过去三十年改革开放的经济增长奇迹是建立在环境急剧恶化的代价之上的,这样的发展注定不可持续。无论对内对外,中国都没有理由推卸自己的责任。

在我看来,或早或迟,谈判是要朝着单轨的方向发展的。因为任何不包含中国和美国这两个世界最大的温室气体排放国的协议都是没有实际效果的。从这个意义上说,哥本哈根会议仍是有成果可言的——它用一种变通的方式将中国和美国拉上了同一条船。


曹海丽,原《财经》杂志高级记者,中外对话特约记者。

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Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

文章不错

文章讲的比较全面,也比较浅显,方便我们这种非专业的读者阅读。可惜作者只在最后两段发表了一下自己的看法,要是能多谈谈“双轨并一轨”的意义和可能性就更好了!

Good article

This article is comprehensive and easy to understand, especially helpful for non-professionals like me. It's a pity that the author doesn't express her own opinions until the last 2 paragraphs. It will be even better to talk more on the meaning and possibility of merging the negotiation from twin-tracks towards single-track.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

一个错误

美国现在有众、参议院两个版本的气候立法。

《清洁能源安全法案》是众议院版气候法案,已经在众议院通过了。

参议院版的气候立法是《清洁能源工作和美国电力法案》,这个法案才是被寄望在春天通过。

再由一个协调委员会对这两个法案进行折中,最后交由总统签字。

A mistake

Currently the United States has two pieces of climate legislation, that of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The 'Clean Energy and Security Act' is the bill proposed by the House of Representation and has already been passed.

The Senate's climate legislation is called the 'Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act'. This bill is expected to be approved in spring.

There will then follow a proposal of compromises for these two bills by the coordination committee, and the final version will then be signed by the President.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

过时的“发展”模式

但是“发展”对中国究竟意味着什么?更多的煤炭使用、更多的汽车和飞机,更多空调,和更多垃圾么?
这种“发展”,能减少这个国家的不安吗?
考虑到可持续发展的需要,考虑到由全球自然资源的有限性而必然导致的价格飞涨,当前这种发展方式是否仍然适宜?
“西方世界”的投资者们(甚至是公共部门的投资者)已经开始对造价昂贵的基础设施建设投资(比如机场建设等)犹豫不决,因为风险正在愈发真实的显现,并不断增加。温室气体减排任务很可能导致这些建设项目在财力不支之前,就变成了过剩的建设项目。

Out of date "development" models

But what does "development" mean for China - even more coal, cars, aeroplanes, air-conditioners, waste?

Will this "development" reduce the current level of unrest across the country?

Is that model of development appropriate given (a) the need for sustainability and (b) the inevitability of steep price increases as the world's natural resources are finite?

Investors (even in the public sectror) are already reluctant to invest in costly infrastructure in the "Western World" due to the real and increasing risk that it (airports, etc) will be redundant before the projects have broken even financially given the obligation to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

皆大欢喜?

也就是说,哥本哈根的失败,不止归功于中国,美国和印度也开心咯?

Happy ending for all?

To put it another way: China is not the only one who is happy to see the failure of Copenhagen, so are America and India?

(translated by Ge Bo)

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

有点错误

“中国反对的理由很简单,这个目标会限制中国的发展”。 这个论断不成立,因为经济增长不可能脱离社会阶层。作者把中国的发展和中国的有产阶级及亿万富翁们混为一谈了。

something wrong

"The reason for China’s opposition was simple:it would restrict China’s development". This assertion is wrong because it doesn't exist an economic growth above the social classes. Then you confuse China's development with the richness of the upper class and the number of the chinese billionaires.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

吕学都的假设

吕学都的解释中存在夸大成分——没有任何人,甚至中国自己也不曾预计在未来的40年里,中国仍将以现在的增长速度发展。对于一个趋于成熟的经济体,增长速度不会超过目前的8-10%,更可能的是在5-7%之间。而能源强度也会随着经济走向成熟而日趋改善。这并不意味着中国预计的增长速度与相应的能源需求存在想当然的一致性,但正如爱因斯坦在另一个场合下说的:“上帝存在于细节中。”

马丁·邦泽尔

What Lu Xuedu assumes

There is some hyperbole in Lu’s comment – nobody, not even China, expects it to continue to grow at its current rate for the next 40 years. As a maturing economy it is bound to be lower than the current 8-10% rate and more likely in the 5-7% range. Its energy intensity is also bound to improve as well as its economy undergoes maturation. That is not to say that China’s planned rate of growth and associated energy needs are self-evidently compatible. But as Einstein said in a different context, “god is in the details”.

Martin Bunzl

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

哥本哈根的失败,给美国赢得了时间

美国对哥本哈根的失败实际上还是很高兴的,最失望的是欧洲,中国跟在后面瞎混,凑热闹。为什么呢?你想啊,美国没有批准京都议定书,在世界舆论面前很被动。Obama总统上来,想在应对气候变化上面改变这种由欧洲主导的局面,获得政治,经济和道义上的分数。如果继续按照京都议定书的路子走,得益最多的是欧洲,而不是美国。就是说,美国为欧洲和中国作嫁衣裳,你说美国人内心愿意吗?!如此的结果,就给美国赢得了时间,在未来的一年时间里可以更全盘的考虑这个棋如何下。中国是看到了1步棋,美国已经看到了3步棋,这就是差距。我们在哥本哈根上只代表了自己,说得越多,就说明你越无知,“言多必失嘛”。美国人的看法的逻辑是,这种全球的协议成功性本来就很小,即便达成了,执行力也是个很大的问题,不如贸易法案来得快,有威慑力。那么就从贸易上下手,通过国内的Waxman Markey法,来规范和约束在国际框架下不好约束的中国和印度(主要是中国)的排放,逼迫这些国家采取措施,为达成国际规则打下基础。如果哥本哈根成功了,那么美国就不好办了,前面费了半天劲才在众议院通过的法就是白忙了。这也就是为什么参院要等到哥本哈根结束才来辩论这部法案的原因。我们可千万不能以为躲过了这一招就万事大吉了。

The Failure of Copenhagen Meeting Gave the U.S. Time

The US is the happiest country to see the failure of Copenhagen, while Europe is the most disappointed, followed by China. Why? The US did not approve the Kyoto Protocol, making the country appear passive in the face of global public opinion. Since President Obama's inauguration, the US has been tring to change the situation of Europe's dominance in climate change issues, as well as its inexorable influence in politics, economics, and morality. If following the route of the Kyoto Protocol, Europe is the clear beneficiary (not the US). In other words, the US would work for the benefit of Europe and China, which I doubt Americans would be willing to do so. Thus, the U.S. has won time to contemplate its next move within the next year. China, on the other hand, knows its next move, while the US already knows its next three moves— this is precisely the disparity. At Copenhagen, we only represented ourselves, the more you say, the more mistakes you will make. America’s logic is the success of such a global protocol is minimal: even if an agreement is reached, there are still problems of implementation and is less effective than the trade bill. So from the perspective of trade, via the Waxman-Markey Bill, comes the regulation and restriction within the international framework to constrain China and India’s (primarily China’s) emissions, forcing these countries to adopt measures because an international agreement was defeated. If Copenhagen had succeeded, then the US would have wasted a lot of time passing the Waxman-Markey Bill through the House. Therefore, this is why the Senate wanted to wait until Copenhagen concluded in debating the bill. Surely, it's stupid to believe that everything will be fine because we survived this time.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

立法要向美国学习

刚巧文章提到的美国的法案我看过,真是不看不知道,看了吓一跳。法案长达1428页,对减排可能牵涉到的方方面面都有详细的描述,计划,要求以及财政支持详情。第一页确实有对中国和印度减排的一些不很明确的要求,主要是希望这两个国家能够实施至少不比美国弱的节能减排要求,然后每年向国会回报进展情况,再探讨如何应对。减排和环保不同点在于,如果没有严格的测量,认证,审核和汇报,那么就是彻头彻尾的闹剧。减少嘛,需要两个数字,一个是基值,一个是现值,缺少任何一个都是没有意义的;任何一个值如果不够精确,从统计的角度看也没有意义。假设你说节约了8%,但是这个值的标准差可能有200%,就是说,你节约的范围可正可负,如果你运气不好,可能根本没有节约,反而更浪费了。这是个很复杂的议题,需要大量的人力和物力确定,不是领导讲一句话能解决问题的。关于减排的方方面面,我们确实要向别人学啊,学会了,出师了,那么论起理来,才更理直气壮,而不像现在这样,说些含混的话,自己事后想起来都觉得站不住脚。

Learning from US Legislation

I recently read an article about the US climate bill and I was shocked at what I discovered. The bill is a staggering 1428 pages long and includes all kinds of detailed descriptions, plans, and requirements as well as the finances regarding the proposed emissions reductions. The first page of the bill does not clearly specify requirements for China and India but states that it hopes both countries will commit to reductions at least as aggressive as those set forth by the US. The bill also stipulates that Congress will report on annual progress and then decide how to respond accordingly. Reducing emissions and protecting the environment are different but both depend on strict measurements, verification, and reporting; without these things it's all a downright farce. When talking about cutting emissions you need two figures: one being the value of contribution and the other being the present value. If you lack either one or if either value if not precise enough from a statistical point of view then all meaning is lost. Suppose you say that you have increased savings by 8%, but the standard deviation of the figure is 200%. This means the scope of your savings could be positive or negative. If you're unlucky, you may have not only saved nothing, but actually wasted more. This is a very complex issue that requires significant attention and many more resources; it's not something that can be resolved with a few words between politicians. With regard to every aspect of reducing emissions, we really must learn from others and fully understand this knowledge before we are able to go beyond with complete confidence. We cannot continue to make vague statements as we do now and then later think to ourselves that we are unable to stand our ground.

Comment translated by Clay Baylor

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

关于“发展意味着什么” 回复3号

3号说的很有道理,但是却回避了中国最现实的问题。发展对中国意味着什么?至少有一点,就是让那些生活艰难和拮据的人,至少可以过上有基本生活保障的生活。物欲的过分膨胀是不明智的,但那并不是发展的全部。

Regarding "What is the meaning of development" in response to comment 3#

The third comment really makes sense, but avoids dealing with China's most real problem. What is the meaning of development to China? It is at least letting those who have a hard life without much money, living a life that is in keeping with the most basic life securities. An unreasonable increase in the desire for things is not sensible, but that is not all that development is comprised of.

Default avatar
匿名 | Anonymous

中国也反对来自发达国家的减排

我所不懂的是,为什么中国也坚持说由欧洲国家、美国和澳大利亚给出的“到2050年碳减排80%到低于1990年水平”的承诺是按照中国的命令。我在《经济学人》上读了哥本哈根会议泄露的一份报告,写着很多领导人(包括萨科奇和默克尔)感到困惑和愤怒,因为中国谈判者坚持说欧洲国家在哥本哈根协议中只根据自己的诉求作出承诺,不管它其实对中国是否同意制定排放上限毫无影响。

奥利维亚

China opposed reductions from developed countries too

What I don't understand is why China also insisted that a commitment by European nations, the US and Australia to an 80% reduction in carbon emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 was also taken out at the behest of China. I read a report on the leaked recordings of Copenhagen meetings in the The Economist in which many leaders (inc. Sarkozy and Merkel) were mystified and infuriated that the Chinese negotiators insisted that European nations take out their own pledges from the Copenhagen Agreement, even though it had no bearing on whether China agreed to an emissions cap or not.

Olivia